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The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is a prominent one in 
the literature and public discourse; intentional discriminatory actions are commonly 
considered particularly morally objectionable relative to unintentional discriminatory 
actions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what the two types amount to, and what generates 
the moral difference between them. The paper develops philosophically-informed 
conceptualizations of the two types based on which the moral difference between them 
may be accounted for. On the suggested account, intentional discrimination is characterized 
by the agent viewing the content of an underlying discriminatory belief as a consideration 
that counts in favor of her action. This, it is argued, amounts to endorsing the discriminatory 
belief, which generates the particular moral severity of intentional discrimination. 
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1. Introduction  
The distinction between intentional and unintentional discrimination is a prominent one in 
the discourse on discrimination and inequality. In American anti-discrimination 
jurisprudence, whether an alleged act of discrimination is intentional has long played a 
central role in determinations of its conformity with anti-discrimination norms.1 The 
importance of the distinction, however, stretches far beyond the adjudication of claims of 
discrimination in legal venues; it is influential in political and everyday moral discourse, 
where allegations of intentionally discriminating against an individual or a group of people is 
 
1 A landmark case that introduced a rule along these lines is Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
While a legal determination that an action is intentionally discriminatory generally means that it 
violates anti-discrimination norms, the exact role that intentionality plays in the legal adjudication of 
claims of discrimination is complex, and several aspects of it remain obscure and controversial; and so 
are the relations between discriminatory actions being classified as intentional for legal purposes and 
them fitting within the legal categories of direct vs. indirect discrimination (or 'disparate 
treatment/impact discrimination'). For a recent overview see Aziz Z. Huq, 'What Is Discriminatory 
Intent?,' Cornell Law Review 103 (2018), pp. 1211-1292. It seems evident that the prominence of the 
distinction in legal contexts draws, in part, on moral convictions about the particular wrongness of 
intentional discrimination, and thus the present discussion may clarify some aspects of anti-
discrimination jurisprudence; however, due to the mentioned difficulties, drawing precise conclusions 
from the present discussion to legal contexts will require further work.  
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commonly taken to mark a particularly high degree of severity.2 To give just a few recent 
examples, allegations of excessive use of force in policing have emphasized that such actions 
involve intentional discrimination against racial minorities; group-based travel and 
immigration bans have been accused of being intentionally discriminatory against the 
targeted groups; and opponents of diversity-based college admission policies have accused 
these institutions of intentionally discriminating against groups that are overrepresented in 
higher education. The notion of unintentional discrimination, on the other hand, has gained 
much attention in recent discussions across the social sciences and policy debates on the 
phenomenon of 'implicit bias': a variety of (possibly, unconscious) mental states that are 
thought to lead to unintentional discriminatory actions. It is commonly stated in these 
discussions that individual instances of unintentional discrimination are less morally 
abhorrent relative to more 'traditional,' intentional forms of discrimination (despite their 
significance in contributing to the persistence of inegalitarian societal patterns).3   
The assumption commonly underlying this wide array of discussions is, then, that 
intentional discriminatory actions are particularly morally objectionable or severe, relative to 
unintentional ones. Despite the centrality of the distinction between the two and its 
significance in all of these debates, however, it remains unclear how the two types may be 
generally characterized, and how to demarcate the difference between them. In other 
words, the literature lacks precise conceptual analysis of the distinction. Since both 
intentional and unintentional discrimination are, presumably, thick moral concepts—both 
describing the nature of a particular phenomenon and morally condemning it in a way that is 
tied to its distinct characteristics—the absence of conceptual analysis leaves the reasons for 
the difference in moral severity between the two obscure as well. To my knowledge, these 
conceptual and ethical questions have not been examined in a way that fully integrates 
relevant theoretical knowledge developed in larger philosophical contexts.  
The present paper thus seeks to develop conceptualizations of intentional and 
unintentional discrimination that clearly demarcate the conceptual difference between 
them, based on which the putative moral difference between the two types may be 
plausibly accounted for. Considering that not much attention has been devoted to this 
endeavor so far, the discussion here pursues this task in an exploratory manner. Specifically, 
it aims at developing conceptualizations that significantly contribute to our understanding of 
these phenomena and adequately accommodate central, clear-cut examples, but not 
necessarily at accommodating all possible cases or presenting necessary and sufficient 
 
2 For philosophical overviews see Andrew Altman, 'Discrimination,' in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), sec. 2.1. 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/discrimination>; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 
Born Free and Equal? A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature of Discrimination (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), pp. 55-61, 111-12.  
3 See, e.g., B. Keith Payne and Heidi A. Vuletich, 'Policy Insights from Advances in Implicit Bias 
Research,' Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2018), p. 50. Similar thoughts are 
present in recent discussions on 'systemic' or 'structural' discrimination. See, e.g., Roland L. Craig, 
Systemic Discrimination in Employment and the Promotion of Ethnic Equality (Leiden; Boston: M. 
Nijhoff, 2006), pp. 93-94. 
Intentional and Unintentional Discrimination 




conditions for intentional and unintentional discrimination.4 Further, in order to keep the 
discussion clear and manageable—among other things, by avoiding complications 
accompanying the appraisal of discriminatory actions performed by collective agents, and 
confabulating factors that are often present where they are performed by public 
institutions, state officials and politicians—the discussion focuses only on individual, 
identifiable discriminatory actions performed by individuals in their private capacity, in the 
course of their interpersonal interactions. As will become clear in Section 5, the discussion is 
friendly to the view that these actions exhibit the normative phenomenon at issue in its 
most vivid form; however, its conclusions may be extended to discriminatory actions 
performed in other contexts and by other types of agents, depending on one’s position on 
the theoretical issues which these may raise. 
On the suggested account, intentional discrimination consists of a discriminatory 
behavior that satisfies the following conditions: it is intentional under a description with a 
discriminatory structure, along the lines of 'differentiating between socially salient groups X 
and Y'; and involves the agent acting based on a motivating reason making reference to the 
content of a discriminatory belief, e.g., 'members of group X are inferior (evil, criminal, etc.).' 
By contrast, in unintentional discrimination, an underlying discriminatory mental state 
causally influences the agent's behavior,5 making her act in a discriminatory manner 
consistent with a discriminatory proposition; but she does not incorporate this 
discriminatory content into her motivating reason. This, I argue, generates the moral 
difference between the two types: in acting with the motivational structure characteristic of 
intentional discrimination the agent endorses her underlying discriminatory belief, thus 
acting with a particularly objectionable attitude. Considering that discriminatory attitudes 
(partly) generate the moral objection to discriminatory actions, this heightened severity is 
what makes intentional discrimination particularly objectionable.      
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify that the paper is concerned with the 
moral status of discriminatory actions, and not with the agent's blameworthiness or moral 
responsibility for performing them or holding discriminatory mental states.6 I also separate 
the questions discussed here from evaluations of the agent's character (as a racist, sexist, 
etc.). While these three distinct moral evaluations seem interrelated in this particular 
context, considering the discussions' exploratory character (and the nascent nature of 
discussions on these related topics), it seems premature to attempt to characterize such 
possible relationship in detail. I therefore take the methodological step of assuming that the 
ethical questions addressed here can be usefully analyzed in isolation from these other 
questions.  
 
4 Similarly, I cannot defend the suggested account against possible alternative conceptualizations, 
which may be developed based on some common usages of the term 'intentional discrimination.' As 
noted in Section 2 (fn 16), however, this account possibly subsumes these conceptualizations. 
5 Throughout, when I say that mental states causally influence the agent's action or behavior, I mean 
that they so in the particular manner in which mental states causally influence actions.  
6 I do assume, however, that these actions and mental states are attributable to the agent—making 
the agent responsible for them in this minimal sense—despite possibly being (in some sense) 
unconscious, and out of the agent's control. This approach roughly aligns with Michael S. Brownstein's 
in The Implicit Mind: Cognitive Architecture, the Self, and Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2018), ch. 4-5. 
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The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some background about the 
nature of discriminatory actions. Conceptualizations of intentional and unintentional 
discrimination are developed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively; the conceptual difference 
between the two is closely examined in these two sections. Section 5 discusses the moral 
difference between the two types. It first discusses the reasons why mental states or 
attitudes are important in generating the moral status of actions that are similar to 
discriminatory actions in important respects; and then shows that there are particular 
reasons to think that whether discriminatory beliefs are intentionally acted on—that is, by 
incorporating their content into one's motivating reasons—matters in evaluating the 
severity of discriminatory actions in particular, as this generates the mentioned 
endorsement. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Discriminatory Actions: Background 
As mentioned, the discussion focuses on individual, identifiable discriminatory actions 
performed by individuals in their private capacity, in the course of their interpersonal 
interactions. Here are some central, clear-cut examples of intentional discriminatory actions 
of this type:   
Small Shop.7 Upon spotting a person whom she believes to be of Roma descent, a 
business owner prevents her from entering her small shop, shouting 'Roma out!'  
Prison.8 A warden in apartheid South Africa gives shorts to Black inmates, and long 
pants to White inmates. She believes that wearing shorts is humiliating; regardless, 
allowing inmates to wear shorts provides them with a material advantage.  
Job Interview. When conducting job interviews, a small business owner is 
deliberately less friendly towards female than male candidates. In making hiring 
decisions, she sometimes rejects female candidates on the spot, without considering 
their professional credentials.  
Unintentional discriminatory actions, by contrast, are usually considered to stem from the 
psychological phenomenon of implicit bias. Here are central examples: 
Unfriendly Behavior.9 Due to her (possibly, unconscious) association of the word 
'black' with concepts with negative valence (e.g., 'bad'), an agent displays less 
friendly behaviors towards African-American interlocutors, relative to White-
American ones. 
 
7 Example from Altman, 'Discrimination.'  
8 This example is revised from Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong? (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2008), p. 5.      
9 All examples of unintentional discrimination discussed herein are based on psychological research. 
See generally, Anthony G. Greenwald and Mahzarin R. Banaji, 'Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, 
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes,' Psychological Review 102 (1995), pp. 4-27; Russell H. Fazio, Joni R. 
Jackson, Bridget C. Dunton, and Carol J. Williams, 'Variability in Automatic Activation as an 
Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: a Bona Fide Pipeline?,' Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology 69 (1995), pp. 1013-27. For this particular behavior, see John F. Dovidio Kerry Kawakami, 
and Samuel L. Gaertner, 'Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction,' Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 82 (2002), pp. 62-68.  
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Shooting Bias.10 Due to her (possibly, unconscious) association of African-Americans 
and concepts related to crime and aggression (or beliefs with corresponding 
discriminatory propositional content), a police officer perceives an ambiguous object 
as a gun when held by a Black suspect, while perceiving the same item as a neutral 
object when held by a White suspect. Upon spotting a black-skinned suspect on a 
dimly lit street, she makes a split-second decision to pull out her gun and shoot the 
suspect (while she would not do the same if the suspect were white-skinned).  
To characterize the basic nature of both intentional and unintentional discriminatory 
actions, I utilize (a slightly revised version of) Andrew Altman's and Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen's conceptual analysis,11 according to which they consist of disadvantageous 
differential treatment of an individual (or a group of people), in a way that corresponds to 
their membership in a socially salient group. 'Socially salient group' refers here to a group 
that is important in regard to a wide range of social interactions in the relevant society. For 
simplicity, and considering that the particular nature of the group involved is immaterial for 
the paper's main claims, I focus on cases involving race, ethnicity, or gender.  
In line with common and robust intuitions—prevalent in both the philosophical and 
legal literature, as well as public discourse—I assume that such actions intrinsically violate 
equality, that is, in a way tied to their distinct discriminatory character, and regardless of 
their contingent consequences (including consequences such as exacerbating inegalitarian 
societal patterns).12 This can be straightforwardly supported by noting that cases such as 
Prison and Unfriendly Behavior do not involve any objectionable consequences (such as 
harming the discriminatee, materially disadvantaging them in any way, or subjecting them to 
an unjust distribution of resources), while undoubtedly exhibiting the core wrong associated 
with discrimination. Similarly, where the objectionable consequences that are presumably 
present in cases such as Job Interview and Shooting Bias are assumed away, this does not 
seem to affect the objection associated with the action's discriminatory features. Note that 
this entails that the moral difference which putatively stems from whether or not such 
actions are intentional under a description making reference to their discriminatory 
features—for which the present discussion aims to account—is distinct and independent 
from a difference in their moral status that might be generated by whether or not they are 
intentional under a description making reference to their objectionable consequences (in 
cases involving such consequences).13 For simplicity, then, I assume away any such 
objectionable consequences throughout the discussion.  
More particularly, what seems to be the wrong-making features of these actions are 
the agent's discriminatory behavior—the differential treatment which corresponds to the 
victim's group identity—combined with her underlying discriminatory mental state(s). This 
thought too is supported by widespread and persistent intuitions associated with the key 
 
10 B. Keith Payne, 'Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in 
Misperceiving a Weapon,' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2001), pp. 181-92. 
11 Altman, 'Discrimination,' sec. 1; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, pp. 13-46.  
12 Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, 'Discrimination and Equality,' in Andrei Marmor (ed.) The Routledge 
Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York and London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 569-83.  
13 In that sense, the ethical question at issue here is importantly different from the one addressed in 
debates over the Doctrine of Double Effect. See the discussion in Section 5A (and fn 39).  
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examples presented above, along with some central accounts of discrimination offered in 
the literature.14 Thus, for example, while it seems unobjectionable for a warden to supply 
different types of clothing to inmates belonging to different socially salient groups based on 
her beliefs about their different physical needs, it would be objectionable to do so based on 
a belief that some prisoners belong to a group deserving to be marked as inferior. Similarly, 
while it would be permissible for a homeowner not to sell her house based on some 
arbitrary or whimsical reason, it would be objectionable to do so in a way influenced by 
group-based hatred.  
I discuss the justification for this view in more detail in Section 5; at this point, note 
that discriminatory mental states may include beliefs with discriminatory or inegalitarian 
content (e.g., that ‘All members of group X are inferior, bad, criminals'), negative emotions 
such as hate or contempt directed at the discriminated group, and discriminatory conceptual 
associations (e.g., associating the word 'Black' with the word 'bad' or 'angry', while 'White' is 
associated with 'good' or ‘calm’). Since it is not my goal here to settle questions about which 
contents (of mental states) are adequately characterized as objectionably discriminatory (for 
instance, whether all group-based generalizations are objectionable, or there are 'benign' 
generalizations15), I use the term 'discriminatory/inegalitarian mental state' as a placeholder 
to denote any mental state whose content is objectionably discriminatory or inegalitarian. If 
one disputes a particular example, she may replace it with a more clearly objectionable one, 
e.g., mental states attributing degrading or dehumanizing traits to the discriminated group, 
or a belief that the group is inferior in some important respect.  
Reflecting the nature of the clear-cut examples of intentional discrimination in 
particular, I take such actions to be underlain by a (conscious or unconscious) discriminatory 
belief (while they may or may not be underlain by other discriminatory mental states as 
well). It is plausible that in Prison, for instance, the discriminator believes that Black people 
are inferior to Whites in some important respect (and therefore deserving of humiliation); in 
Small Shop, the discriminator seems to believe something along the lines of 'People of Roma 
descent are [negative trait] and should not be associated with'; and in Job Interview, that 
'Women are unsuitable for the workplace.'16As will become clear, the nature of the mental 
state appropriately attributed to agents performing unintentional discriminatory actions is a 
matter of debate; I discuss this point in Section 4.  
 
 
14 This view aligns most naturally with mental-state accounts of discrimination. See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander's (now retracted) account in 'What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, 
Preferences, Stereotypes, and Proxies,' University of Pennsylvania Law Review 141 (1992), pp. 149-
219; and overview at Lippert-Rasmussen, Born Free and Equal?, pp. 103-128. However, it seems 
compatible with any account that lends some role to mental states in generating the wrongness of 
discriminatory actions, including, e.g., Benjamin Eidelson's in Discrimination and Disrespect (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).   
15 See Erin Beeghly, 'What Is a Stereotype? What Is Stereotyping?,' Hypatia 30 (2015), pp. 675–691; 
Lawrence Blum, 'Stereotypes and Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis,' Philosophical Papers 33 (2004), pp. 
251–289.   
16 Some notions of intentional discrimination associate it with hate, animosity, or a desire to exclude 
the group. It is plausible that in such cases the action is also underlain by a discriminatory belief, and 
thus the account developed here might subsume these general notions.  
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3. Intentional Discrimination 
The discussion in this section oscillates between close examination of the cases and laying 
out the relevant theoretical background about the motivational phenomena that they 
involve—including intentional action, intentions, and motivating reasons. From the vast 
literature on these topics, I adopt a set of theoretical positions that, while not universally 
accepted, are prominent in the relevant debates and seem particularly useful in developing 
the requisite conceptualizations. This, of course, requires simplification and ignoring 
difficulties with these positions that have been discussed in the literature. Note, however, 
that the cases examined here often do not exhibit the features based on which challenges to 
these positions have been mounted—and so it is possible that even if one holds theoretical 
positions that diverge from the ones adopted here, this would not have significant 
implications for the discussion.17  
 
A. Intentional Action, Intentions, and Discriminatory Actions  
I employ certain theoretical assumptions on the nature of intentional action and intentions. 
First, I use a coarse-grained individuation of action. To use Davidson's famous example, if by 
flipping a switch I turn on the light and also alert a burglar—all of these constitute a single 
action; the action would be intentional under a certain description, for instance, 'turning on 
the light,' but not 'alerting the burglar.'18 I further assume that there are behaviors or bodily 
movements which constitute genuine actions—that is, that are not mere bodily movements 
or reflexes—which are not, on the other hand, cases of fully intentional action. That is, I 
allow for an in-between category of unintentional action;19 as this might be controversial, 
Section 4 briefly discusses the justification for this view, and illustrates that there are good 
reasons to suppose that central cases of unintentional discrimination—such as Shooting 
Bias—fall within this category. With respect to actions that are intentional, I assume that 
they may reflect varying levels of agency or autonomy. For instance, where an agent 
consciously acts on a motivating reason (as will become clear, by 'motivating reasons' I mean 
considerations which the agent views as counting in favor of her action), her action may 
reflect a higher level of agency or autonomy, relative to an action where she acts 
(intentionally) on unconscious motivating reasons or for no reason at all. Such an elevated 
 
17 For instance, Bratman's famous objection to the 'Simple View' (the view employed here) about the 
relation between intentional action and intentions has been developed based on problems posed for 
it by actions involving complex sets of intentions, which are not typically present in cases discussed 
here. See Michael Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1987), ch. 8-9.   
18 Donald Davison, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes,' The Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), pp. 685-700; 
G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention. 2nd edn (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957). 
19 Tamar Szabó Gendler, 'Between Reason and Reflex: Response to Commentators,' Analysis 72 
(2012), pp. 799–811; Bence Nanay, Between Perception and Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), pp. 81-86.   
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level of agency or autonomy is not required, however, for intentional action; some actions 
are adequately characterized as intentional despite lacking these features.20  
I also assume certain things about the relation between intentional action and the 
agent's present-directed intentions, or the intentions she holds with respect to her present 
action21 (as distinct from intentions for the future; the latter are irrelevant for the discussion 
here). First, I take present-directed intentions to be a distinct type of mental state, involving 
an attitude of resoluteness or settledness towards a certain course of action;22 second, I 
assume that intentionally A-ing entails intending to A, or holding a present-directed 
intention to A; and third, that the description under which a given action is intentional 
(roughly) corresponds to the content of the agent's present-directed intention.23 Thus, 
where an action is intentional under the description 'turning on the light,' this means that 
the agent acts with a present-directed intention to 'turn on the light.'  
Some additional clarifications are needed considering some (implicit or explicit) 
assumptions common in the discourse on discrimination in particular. First, present-directed 
intentions do not have to be formed prior to a given intentional action; they may accompany 
an intentional action which the agent spontaneously embarks on. Consider the business 
owner in Small Shop: it is plausible she had not formed an intention prior to performing her 
action; rather, she may have spontaneously responded to seeing the victim by acting in a 
discriminatory manner. Her action seems intentional nevertheless.24 Relatedly, it is 
important to highlight that performing an intentional action does not require that the agent 
be conscious, or consciously aware, of performing it (at least on some ways of 
understanding the nature of such consciousness). Similarly, acting with a certain intention 
does not necessitate consciously entertaining it, either prior to or at the point of acting (and 
similar things can be said about the agent's motivating reasons, discussed below). Consider 
again the discriminator in Small Shop: she may have not consciously entertained her 
intention prior to or at the point of acting, nor may she have been consciously aware of 
performing an intentional action—perhaps because she acts out of habit, or without 
attending to her action when performing it; her action seems intentional nevertheless.25  
 
20 James David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford and New York: Clarendon, 2000), 
pp. 1-31; Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 215-
32.  
21 Or the agent's 'intention-in-action'; John R. Searle, Intentionality: an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).    
22 Hugh J. McCann, 'Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,' American Philosophical Quarterly 28 
(1991), p. 26.  
23 Frederick Adams, 'Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View,' Mind & Language 1 (1986), 
pp. 281–301.  
24 Searle, Intentionality, pp. 84-85.  
25 Anscombe, Intention, and Kieran Setiya, 'Knowledge of Intention,' in Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, 
and Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011), pp. 170–197; Bill Pollard, 'Explaining Actions with Habits,' American Philosophical Quarterly 43 
(2006), pp. 62-63. A common thought in both legal and psychological literatures associates 
intentionality with consciousness in the context of discrimination, but often it is not clear what is 
meant by 'conscious discrimination' in these discussions. As intentionality is not commonly 
considered to necessitate consciousness in philosophical discussions, we should remain open to the 
possibility that there are intentional discriminatory actions which are unconscious in some sense.   
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Let us examine intentional discriminatory actions in light of these theoretical 
premises. Discriminatory actions (both intentional and unintentional) are characterized by a 
distinct structure or pattern: a single action consists of several simpler or more basic actions, 
which diverge in a way corresponding to the group identity of the people towards which 
they are directed (e.g., behaving in a friendly manner towards male job candidates and in an 
unfriendly manner towards female candidates). Presumably, then, for a given discriminatory 
behavior to constitute intentional discrimination, it has to be intentional under a description 
incorporating this particular feature. To wit, it is not enough that each of the actions 
constituting the discriminatory pattern is intentional on its own; rather, the differentiation 
between the simpler actions and its correspondence to the group identity of the people 
towards which these simpler actions are directed has to be intentional.  
Hence, for discriminatory behavior to constitute intentional discrimination, it has to 
be intentional under a description such as 'differentiating between inmates in the 
distribution of pants, in a way corresponding to whether they are Black or White,' or 
'denying entry to people of Roma descent, while allowing entry to people of non-Roma 
descent.' Since the nature of the actions of which the discriminatory pattern is composed is 
not itself important, the description under which the action is intentional must have a 
general discriminatory structure—such as 'treating socially salient groups X and Y 
differently,' or 'treating people differently in a way corresponding to their group identity,' or 
any essentially similar description. In line with the mentioned theoretical premises, the 
content of the agent's intention in such a scenario would correspond to this description, and 
have a generally discriminatory structure.  
Understanding the functional role of intentions (along with that of motivating 
reasons, discussed below) will be important in accounting for the putative moral difference 
between intentional and unintentional discrimination. As mentioned, I take intentions to 
consist of a distinct attitude of resoluteness towards a certain course of action; in this sense, 
they involve a practical commitment to this course of action. As for their functional role, it is 
often thought to involve providing a settled objective for an (intentional) action, and 
controlling or sustaining its execution in light of that objective.26 It can be said, then, that in 
acting with a certain intention, the agent is practically committed to controlling her course 
of action in light of the settled objective provided by her intention. In the case just 
mentioned, for instance, the warden is practically committed to 'differentiating between 
inmates in the distribution of pants, in a way that corresponds to whether they are Black or 
White.' I return to this point in Section 5.  
I have argued that intentional discrimination requires that the agent's discriminatory 
behavior be intentional under a description with a discriminatory structure. Clearly, 
however, this is not enough; such an action may be entirely unobjectionable. This possibility 
is illustrated by a case where an agent intentionally provides different types of clothing to 
members of different social groups, where her underlying reasoning makes reference to the 
different needs of these groups; such an action would be 'intentionally discriminatory' only 
in a non-moralized sense. This is not a surprising conclusion: I started the discussion by 
 
26 McCann, 'Settled Objectives and Rational Constraints,' p. 26; Robert Audi, 'Intention, Cognitive 
Commitment, and Planning,' Synthese 86 (1991), pp. 363-64.  
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highlighting that the wrong-making features of discriminatory actions are the discriminatory 
behavior in conjunction with the underlying inegalitarian mental state—an inegalitarian 
belief in the case of intentional discrimination. Presumably, then, wrongful intentional 
discrimination involves a motivational structure that incorporates this belief in some 
appropriate way. In the next subsection, I argue that this is best explicated as a requirement 
that the agent act on a motivating reason incorporating the content of her underlying 
discriminatory belief.  
 
B. Intentional Discrimination and Motivating Reasons  
Extensive discussions are devoted in the literature to motivating reasons, and there is much 
divergence in the terminology which authors employ, and the substantive positions 
defended about the nature of motivating reasons and the role they play in action. Some 
clarifications of terminology, and about larger theoretical issues raised in these debates, are 
needed to effectively present the theoretical assumptions employed here.27  
First, I use the term 'motivating reasons' to refer to considerations which the agent 
views as counting in favor of her action, and in light of which she acts.28 It is easy to identify 
the content of a motivating reason by examining what the agent would say if asked why she 
acted the way she did; presumably, even if the agent is not conscious of her motivating 
reasons at the time of acting, they are in principle available to her consciousness, and their 
content would be conveyed by the answer to that question. I assume that motivating 
reasons are conceptually distinct, and may diverge in their content in a given action from 
'normative reasons'—the latter are considerations that actually count in favor of the action 
(if there are such). Presumably, in many cases of wrongful intentional discrimination the 
consideration the agent views as counting in favor of her action—whose content consists, as 
discussed below, of the content of her discriminatory belief—does not, of course, constitute 
a normative reason at the same time.  
I assume that motivating reasons, or the content of an agent's motivating reasons, 
consist of the content of her (possibly false) beliefs, i.e., putative or believed facts (or, 
alternatively, propositions or the truth-makers of propositions); this is contrary to some 
views on which motivating reasons consist of beliefs. These believed facts may not obtain in 
reality, as is the case with the content of many discriminatory beliefs.29 Relatedly, the 
literature sometimes talks of 'explanatory reasons' (or 'reason explanations'); I use these 
 
27 This overview, along with the particular terminology and substantive positions employed here, is 
based on María Alvarez's discussion in Kinds of Reasons: An Essay in The Philosophy of Action (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) and 'Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation,' in 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/. I also assume that acting 
based on motivating reasons entails that the action is intentional (but not the other way around). See 
María Alvarez, 'Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason,' Inquiry 52 (2009), pp. 293–305. 
28 Other terms used to denote roughly the same phenomenon include 'the agent's reason' and 
'agential reasons.'    
29 Alvarez, 'Reasons for Action,' sec. 3.1; Kinds of Reasons, pp. 124-64. As will become clear, I do not 
use 'motivating reasons' as a factive term in a sense implying that these putative facts play a causal 
role in the agent's action.  
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terms to refer to mental states that are causally responsible for the action and may provide 
a causal explanation of it, and assume that there is a conceptual distinction between these 
and motivating reasons (and between them and normative reasons). At a minimum, where 
an agent acts based on a motivating reason making reference to a (putative) fact that does 
not actually obtain, her motivating reason diverges from the explanatory reason of the 
action: the former consists of this putative fact, while the latter consists of her false belief 
representing the relevant fact as obtaining. I assume, then, that when an agent acts on a 
motivating reason, the belief that represents the relevant fact as obtaining must be part of 
what explains her action in causal terms (while there may also be other mental states that 
are 'reason explanations' of her action). 
With these clarifications in mind, we can turn to understanding the role of 
motivating reasons in the conceptualization of wrongful intentional discrimination. As 
already noted (and further discussed in Section 5), intentional discriminatory actions are 
underlain by a discriminatory belief, which is jointly constitutive—with the group-based 
differential treatment—of their wrongness. It therefore seems that an adequate 
conceptualization of intentional discrimination has to incorporate the discriminatory belief 
in the agent's motivational structure in some appropriate way. We have also seen that the 
content of one's motivating reasons makes reference to the content of one’s beliefs. Hence, 
a natural way in which a certain belief may be incorporated into one's motivational structure 
is by incorporating its content into one's motivating reason. It can be said, then, that 
wrongful intentional discrimination requires both that (1) the discriminatory behavior be 
intentional under a description with a discriminatory structure, and (2) the agent's 
motivating reason makes reference to the content of her underlying discriminatory belief.  
This suggestion makes theoretical sense, and seems to adequately accommodate 
the central, clear-cut examples of intentional discrimination. For instance, in Small Shop, it is 
plausible that the agent incorporates the content of her discriminatory belief—presumably, 
'People of Roma descent are [negative trait] and should not be associated with'—in her 
motivating reason. If asked why she acted the way she did, she would presumably say, 'I did 
not let that person into my shop [while letting in people of non-Roma descent] because 
people of Roma descent are [negative trait].' Similar things may be said about the agents in 
Prison and Job interview: they would be disposed to present the content of their underlying 
discriminatory belief if asked why they acted the way they did, that is, if asked to point to 
the content of their motivating reason.  
As further discussed in Section 5, the functional role of motivating reasons is 
significant in generating the moral difference between intentional and unintentional 
discrimination. However, beyond the general thought that motivating reasons guide the 
agent in performing her action or executing her intention, not much attention has been 
devoted to this functional role in the literature.30 Here, I tentatively suggest—without 
purporting to fully explicate or defend this claim—that this common thought is plausibly 
 
30 See brief discussions in Dustin Locke, 'Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons,' American 
Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2015), pp. 215–232; Raimo Tuomela, 'Motivating Reasons for Action,' in 
Mark Timmons, John Greco and Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Rationality and the Good: Critical Essays on the 
Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 178-84.   
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explicated along the following lines. While the agent's intention controls her overarching 
course of action in light of its objective, her motivating reason(s) determine the nature of 
the subsidiary (or fine-grained) actions of which this overarching course of action is 
composed.31 Thus, in executing her intentional action, an agent is disposed to adjust these 
subsidiary actions so that they would match the content of her motivating reason(s) in some 
appropriate way. This means that while an agent’s overarching course of action would be 
identical in two actions where she acts with an identical intention, her subsidiary actions 
would diverge if she acts with diverging motivating reasons.  
This divergence seems particularly important where discriminatory actions are 
concerned. Consider two agents acting with an identical intention, involving, for instance, 
the distribution of different types of clothing to individuals belonging to different socially 
salient groups. The motivating reason of Agent A appeals to the proposition 'Group X is 
inferior to Group Y, and should be humiliated,' while the motivating reason of Agent B 
appeals to the putative fact that 'Group X and Group Y have different physical needs when it 
comes to clothing.' The overarching course of action in these two scenarios would be 
identical, and involve distributing different types of clothing in a way that corresponds to the 
group identity of the recipients. However, in executing her intention, Agent A would pick 
items of clothing considered humiliating (and give them to Group X), while Agent B would 
choose items of clothing that are accommodating of each group's needs. Similarly, the two 
agents would change these subsidiary actions in different ways upon finding out that certain 
pieces of clothing are suitable for Group X's physical needs—this would influence the 
subsidiary actions of Agent B, but not of Agent A.   
Following the comments about the practical commitment embedded in acting with a 
certain intention, it may accordingly be said that the content of one's motivating reasons 
determines the content of one’s practical commitment, when the latter is characterized in a 
fine-grained manner, that is, one that considers not only the agent's overall course of action, 
but also her fine-grained, subsidiary actions. Thus, where Agent A's fine-grained practical 
commitment is along the lines of 'Treating inferior Group X and superior Group Y differently 
in the distribution of clothing,' Agent B is practically committed to 'differentiating between 
Group X, which has certain physical needs, and Group Y, which has different physical needs.' 
More generally, in acting intentionally with a motivating reason, an agent is practically 
committed to executing her intention in a way which appropriately matches the content of 




4. Unintentional Discrimination 
Unintentional discriminatory actions—as in Unfriendly Behavior and Shooting Bias—are 
commonly considered to stem from the psychological phenomenon of implicit bias. A 
 
31 See discussion of subsidiary actions in Markos Valaris, 'The Instrumental Structure of Actions,' The 
Philosophical Quarterly 65 (2015), pp. 64-70, 76-77.  
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preliminary challenge in conceptualizing unintentional discrimination is tied to the fact that 
it is still not clear what these implicit biases consist of. In line with central positions in recent 
discussions, I assume that implicit biases are mental states, and remain neutral as to 
whether they are conceptual associations, beliefs, or another type of mental state (such as 
'aliefs').32  
This assumption does not seem problematic, as it is inconsequential for our 
purposes. Since the present discussion is concerned with the moral status of discriminatory 
actions—and not, as in recent literature on implicit bias, with the nature and moral 
evaluation of the implicit biases themselves, or with the agent's moral responsibility for 
harboring them—what seems important is the role which implicit biases play in generating 
unintentional discriminatory actions. Here there is not much controversy: regardless of the 
type of mental state they are, implicit biases are widely thought to causally influence the 
agent to act in a discriminatory manner—particularly one consistent with believing a 
discriminatory proposition corresponding to their content. Thus, whether or not the agent in 
Unfriendly Behavior believes that 'Black people are bad' or alternatively only associates the 
concept 'Black' with 'Bad,' she is causally influenced by her implicit bias to act in a 
discriminatory manner consistent with believing that 'Black people are bad.'33 It seems 
consensual, on the other hand, that in performing unintentional discriminatory actions the 
agent does not view this discriminatory propositional content as a consideration counting in 
favor of her action, and does not guide her action so it would match this content in the 
manner characteristic of acting based on motivating reasons. Here too, a close examination 
of the cases is illustrative.  
A plausible way of understanding Unfriendly Behavior is the following. The agent in 
this case may intentionally treat her conversational counterparts differently—for instance, 
she may smile more or less at or stand closer or farther away from an interlocutor—based 
on how pleasant she feels around them, or on whether or not they seem to display positive 
emotions. Alternatively, she may not intend to differentiate between interlocutors at all. 
Either way, due to her implicit bias she consistently feels less positive emotion around Black 
people, or tends to perceive them as exhibiting more negative emotions—which leads her to 
display fewer friendly behaviors around members of the group.34 Thus, she is causally 
influenced by her implicit bias to act in a discriminatory manner consistent with believing a 
 
32 See discussion in Michael Brownstein and Jennifer Saul, 'Introduction,' in Implicit Bias and 
Philosophy, pp. 1-9 (implicit biases are conceptual associations); Tamar Szabó Gendler, 'On the 
Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias,' Philosophical Studies 156 (2011), pp. 33–63 (associative 'aliefs'); Eric 
Mandelbaum, 'Attitude, Inference, Association: On the Propositional Structure of Implicit Bias,' Noûs 
50 (2016), pp. 629–58 (beliefs or belief-like mental states); Neil Levy, 'Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit 
Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements,' Noûs 49 (2015), pp. 800–23 (a sui generis mental state). I also 
remain neutral on whether implicit biases are unconscious (and in what sense).    
33 This assumption seems to motivate debates on whether agents are adequately attributed 
discriminatory beliefs based on such unintentional actions. See, e.g., Eric Schwitzgebel, 'Acting 
Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief,' 
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2010), pp. 531–553.  
34 See Arianna Bagnis, Alessia Celeghin, Cristina Onesta Mosso, and Marco Tamietto, 'Toward an 
Integrative Science of Social Vision in Intergroup Bias,' Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 102 
(2019), pp. 318–326; and discussion in Alex Madva and Michael Brownstein, 'Stereotypes, Prejudice, 
and the Taxonomy of the Implicit Social Mind,' Noûs 52 (September 2018), pp. 611–644.    
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discriminatory proposition such as 'Black people are bad,' but does not see this content as a 
consideration counting in favor of her action.  
Shooting Bias seems like a different type of case. As mentioned above, some 
behaviors seem to constitute genuine actions, but at the same time not to constitute a fully 
intentional action (some call these semi-, or quasi-intentional actions). Gendler claims that 
they occupy a middle ground 'between reason and reflex.' The category is unique because 
unlike reflexes or mere behaviors, the representational content of the underlying mental 
state plays a significant role in initiating the action and determining its nature; however, 
unlike fully intentional actions, it is processed only in a shallow manner: one that does not 
fully involve the agent's reasoning capacities.35 Shooting Bias seems to fall into this category, 
and it too can therefore be described as a case where the agent is causally influenced by her 
underlying mental state to act in a discriminatory manner consistent with believing, e.g., 
that 'Black people are criminals'—but where she does not incorporate this content into her 
motivating reason.  
Both of these central examples of unintentional discrimination, then, involve a 
discriminatory action—one that is either intentional under a non-discriminatory description 
or quasi-intentional—that does not satisfy the second condition specified above: in both, the 
agent does not incorporate the propositional content of her underlying discriminatory 
mental state in her motivating reason. Note that while these cases also do not satisfy the 
first condition—both are not intentional (or fully intentional) under a description with a 
discriminatory structure—it is possible in principle to think of an objectionable 
discriminatory action, i.e., one where the differential treatment is underlain by a 
discriminatory mental state, which satisfies the first but not the second condition. Suppose, 
for instance, that an agent intentionally differentiates between men and women in job 
interviews, where her motivating reason refers to the (putative) fact that her business needs 
more male employees (for some legitimate reason). In performing her action, however, she 
is partly causally influenced by her unconscious association of 'women' with 'home life,' 
making her rate women lower on measures of work-related skills. Such a case seems 
intuitively objectionable only as an instance of unintentional (but not intentional) 
discrimination.  
The opposite scenario seems much less likely. This would involve a discriminatory 
behavior underlain by a discriminatory mental state, where the agent incorporates the 
discriminatory content of the mental state in her motivating reason (which necessarily, on 
the theoretical premises adopted here, makes the action fully intentional)—but where the 
action is nevertheless not intentional under a discriminatory description. The implausibility 
of such a scenario indicates that the dominant feature differentiating intentional from 
unintentional discrimination is the satisfaction of the second condition. This is because in 
what seems to be a range of plausible cases, assuming that the basic conditions for a 
discriminatory action obtain (i.e., the action consists of a differential treatment underlain by 
a discriminatory mental state), it is enough that the second condition is satisfied for the 
action to constitute wrongful intentional discrimination, while the same is not true for the 
 
35 Gendler, 'Between Reason and Reflex'; Nanay, 'Between Perception and Action,' pp. 81-86.  
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first condition. The discussion of the moral difference between intentional and unintentional 
discrimination in the next section is based on this insight.  
 
5. The moral difference between intentional and unintentional discrimination 
The conceptual difference between intentional and unintentional discrimination can be 
drawn, then, along the lines suggested above: the main feature separating the two is that in 
intentional discrimination the agent incorporates the content of her discriminatory belief 
into her motivating reason, that is, views it as a consideration counting in favor of her action, 
and guides her action based on this content in the way characteristic of acting based on 
motivating reasons. This is while in unintentional discrimination a discriminatory mental 
state only causally influences her action. Here, I argue that acting with the motivational 
structure characteristic of intentional discrimination involves endorsement of the underlying 
discriminatory belief; and that this particularly objectionable attitude is what generates the 
severity of intentional discriminatory actions.  
This claim builds on some more basic assumptions about the role which 
discriminatory mental states or attitudes—not just intentions—play in generating the 
wrongness of both intentional and unintentional discriminatory actions. I have briefly 
illustrated the intuitive plausibility of the thought that discriminatory mental states are 
partly constitutive of the wrongness of such actions in Section 2; supporting the claim about 
the moral difference between the two types will benefit, however, from elaborating on its 
principled justification. This is discussed in subsection A, which also supports the general 
claim that whether an underlying objectionable attitude is intentionally acted on matters for 
the degree of wrongness of actions whose moral status is partly constituted by such 
attitudes. Subsection B then shows that whether the underlying objectionable attitude—
particularly, a discriminatory belief—is intentionally acted on is significant for the moral 
appraisal of discriminatory actions in particular, as this plausibly involves endorsement of 
the belief's objectionable content.   
 
A. Discriminatory mental states and the moral status of discriminatory actions 
As the key examples of discriminatory actions mentioned throughout the discussion 
indicate, persistent intuitions maintain that the group-based differential treatment they 
involve is not enough to make them morally objectionable; rather, in both intentional and 
unintentional cases the action has to be accompanied or underlain by a discriminatory 
mental state for them to be objectionable in a characteristically discriminatory way. In that 
sense, discriminatory actions are similar to other actions performed in the course of 
interpersonal interactions, which seem objectionable in a way importantly tied to the 
agent's underlying mental states or attitudes—and not just their behavioral features (or 
their objectionable consequences; as we have seen, discriminatory actions often do not 
involve the latter).  
A central example, often mentioned together with discriminatory actions to 
highlight this point, is that of publicly humiliating someone. Suppose, for instance, that I 
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share some potentially embarrassing information about a coworker in front of our mutual 
colleagues.36 While in terms of behavior or consequences my action consists of just that—
and can adequately be described as 'publicly sharing embarrassing information'—when it is 
accompanied by an attitude of condescension and indifference towards my colleague's 
feelings, the action arguably amounts to (objectionable) humiliation. Notice that for this to 
be the case I do not have to intend to embarrass my colleague, intentionally act on my 
condescending attitudes, or, more generally, have any malicious or otherwise objectionable 
intentions or motives; rather, it is enough that my action is accompanied or influenced by an 
objectionable attitude, to which my behavior of sharing the information is somehow 
appropriately related. Similar things can be said about, e.g., exercising my power as a 
governmental official to refuse someone's request in a bureaucratic process: while such 
refusal may be unobjectionable where it is within my position's authority, in a case where it 
is influenced by my attitude of megalomanic desire for bureaucratic power and control, my 
action would constitute an objectionable abuse of power.  
 In such examples, the action's nature and its ethical features seem inextricably 
bound with the agent's underlying mental states or attitudes. In other words, what seems to 
matter for their moral assessment is not a 'thin' description of the agent's behavior, but a 
'thick' description that also encompasses these underlying mental states or attitudes.37 Thus, 
discriminatory actions (of the types discussed here) are appropriately characterized as such, 
that is, as involving an objectionable form of group-based differential treatment, in virtue of 
the agent's underlying discriminatory mental states or attitudes.  
It is important to note that the negative moral appraisal of such actions does not 
have to amount to a determination that performing them is impermissible, or all-things-
considered impermissible; in other words, the claim that the agent's underlying mental 
states transform an otherwise morally neutral or permissible action into an objectionable 
one does not entail that the action is rendered impermissible in virtue of these mental 
states. At a minimum, such a judgment does not seem appropriate where unintentional 
discriminatory actions are concerned—whereas those are plainly the appropriate target of 
some negative moral appraisal nevertheless, e.g., being morally criticizable, objectionable, 
wrongful, or bad. Similarly, performing intentional discriminatory actions might be 
permissible in some contexts despite being the appropriate target of such negative moral 
appraisal, e.g., when performing them is within the agent's legitimate scope of discretion. 
For example, it seems permissible for a homeowner to refuse to sell her house for any 
reason, despite the decision not to sell it to someone on account of her group membership 
being morally criticizable or bad.38  
As some authors have commented, then, when actions of the type discussed here 
are concerned, i.e., those taking place in the course of interpersonal interactions, and whose 
 
36 The discussion and examples here draw from Hallvard Lillehammer, 'Scanlon on Intention and 
Permissibility,' Analysis 70 (2010), pp. 578-585. 
37 Lillehammer, 'Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility,' p. 580; Richard J. Arneson , 'What is 
Wrongful Discrimination,' San Diego Law Review 43 (2006), pp. 781-82; Laurence A. Blum, Friendship, 
Altruism, and Morality (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 99-104.   
38 Lillehammer, 'Scanlon on Intention and Permissibility,' p. 584; Steven Sverdlik, 'Motive and 
Rightness,' Ethics 106 (1996), pp. 341-44. 
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objectionable character is inextricably bound with the agent's underlying attitudes—as 
opposed, say, to actions involving very bad consequences or violation of the victim's strong, 
negative rights (e.g., killing of innocents)—a nuanced approach to their moral appraisal, 
which allows for judgments other than straightforward permissibility and impermissibility, 
seems called for. Discriminatory mental states seem significant for such moral evaluation, 
even if they do not play the particular role of rendering an otherwise permissible action 
impermissible.39    
The thought that whether the agent intentionally acts on her objectionable attitudes 
matters in determining such actions’ degree of severity (wrongness, badness, etc.) seems to 
flow naturally from the premise that objectionable attitudes are an important part of what 
generates these actions' wrongness to begin with. Thus, to continue the above discussion, if 
I intentionally act on my condescending attitudes and cause embarrassment to my 
colleague, that would constitute a particularly severe instance of humiliation; and if I act 
with a particular intention to subdue a person out of a megalomanic sense of bureaucratic 
power and control, that would be a particularly objectionable instance of abuse of power. 
The next section shows that there are special reasons to think that this is the case where 
discriminatory actions are concerned, as intentionally acting on the underlying belief (by 
incorporating its content into one's motivating reasons) involves, as mentioned, a 
particularly objectionable attitude of endorsing its discriminatory content.  
  
B. Endorsement of the underlying discriminatory belief and the particular severity of 
intentional discrimination   
The notion of endorsement of mental states is commonly invoked in a variety of 
philosophical contexts, and so I assume that despite some possible controversy or unclarity 
at the margins, we are equipped with a sufficiently clear understanding of it. Roughly, 
endorsement consists of some form of positive evaluation or a pro-attitude directed at the 
mental state—that can be, inter alia, of epistemic or ethical nature and have emotional or 
affective components. In the case of belief, endorsement presumably involves a higher level 
of epistemic commitment or a more robust positive epistemic evaluation of its content 
relative to merely viewing it as truthful (the latter is, presumably, already present in simply 
holding the belief).40   
 
39 Patrick S. Shin, 'The Substantive Principle of Equal Treatment,' Legal Theory 15 (2009), pp. 170-71; 
Arneson, 'What is Wrongful Discrimination,' pp. 782-83. In that sense, the claim defended here is 
different from the one at issue in debates over the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). There, it is 
debated (very roughly) whether the agent's intentions relative to a very bad outcome her action 
brings about—the death of innocents—matters for the permissibility of her action. As the authors 
mentioned here have commented, this difference entails that debates over the DDE do not have 
straightforward implications for actions such as discrimination (cf. T.M Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: 
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 58-60, 
72-75, 88).     
40 Adam Leite, 'Changing One’s Mind: Self-Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement,' Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research 97 (2018), pp. 150–171; Michael Huemer, 'Moore's Paradox and the 
Norm of Belief,' in Susana Nuccetelli and Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays In 
Epistemology And Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), p. 148.   
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 Why think that intentional discriminatory actions involve an attitude of 
endorsement towards the underlying discriminatory belief (or its content)? Before clarifying 
this point, it is important to note two things about the claim advanced here. First, I claim 
that acting in an intentionally discriminatory manner itself involves a tacit endorsement of 
the discriminatory belief; such endorsement does not necessitate conscious, deliberate 
reflection on the belief or its content (as discussed above, intentional discrimination does 
not require that the underlying belief is conscious or consciously entertained). Second, for 
our purposes it is sufficient to indicate that such an attitude is present at the point of 
performing a discriminatory action; I remain neutral on whether it is likely to be (or 
necessarily is, etc.) global and diachronically stable, that is, whether the agent would retain 
this attitude across a variety of activities and contexts, and preserve it through time (as 
mentioned in the introduction, that also means that I separate the moral appraisal of 
individual discriminatory actions from evaluations of the agent’s character as a racist, sexist, 
etc.; the latter may be tied with such global and diachronically stable endorsement of 
discriminatory beliefs).41   
The claim that in performing an intentionally discriminatory action an agent tacitly 
endorses her underlying discriminatory belief may be supported by examining the features 
of this belief and showing that there is a significant change in them—indicative of its 
endorsement—that is plausibly attributed to the performance of the action. Thus, it is useful 
to examine a case where an agent holds a discriminatory belief not endorsed prior to 
performing her action. Due to the socially-transmitted nature of many discriminatory beliefs, 
such cases are familiar and widespread. Consider, for instance, a slightly adjusted version of 
Small Shop. Suppose that the business owner (let us call her Rachel) has grown up in a 
society where anti-Roma sentiments and beliefs are widespread, but not commonly 
discussed in a direct and deliberate manner. Thus, it is plausible that Rachel has passively 
acquired many anti-Roma beliefs—for instance, associating the group with negative traits or 
prescribing offensive behaviors to it—due, inter alia, to her consistent perceptual exposure 
to stereotypical representations of the group, or participation in conversations in which 
inegalitarian propositions are vaguely or indirectly implied. Such beliefs are plausibly 
characterized as unendorsed.  
Upon spotting a person of Roma descent attempting to enter her shop, Rachel 
promptly refuses to let her in, while shouting 'Roma out!' Plausibly, such a spontaneous 
action takes place without Rachel reflecting on her discriminatory belief and explicitly 
endorsing it. Nevertheless, the action seems to involve an important change in the belief's 
status, amounting to endorsement. Up to the point of performing the action, Rachel may 
have viewed the belief's discriminatory content as truthful; but in intentionally acting on it 
 
41 To clarify, then, this means that committed egalitarians, as well as committed racists or sexists (and 
anything in between) may perform intentional discriminatory actions, and vice versa: presumably, 
committed racists and sexists may also be implicitly biased, and when they act in a discriminatory 
manner influenced by these implicit biases their action is adequately characterized as unintentional 
discrimination. Relatedly, I do not assume that discriminatory beliefs endorsed in this manner should 
be associated with the agent's 'deep self' or any privileged part of her mental economy. Generally, the 
discussion is friendly to views on which agents' mental economy might be non-homogenous or 
'fractured.' See Brownstein, The Implicit Mind, pp. 33-37. 
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she has moved to viewing this content as a consideration counting in favor of acting. That is, 
she adopts an attitude towards the discriminatory content that reflects a higher level of 
epistemic confidence or commitment relative to an unendorsed belief—she is willing to 
perform an intentional action that would be effective or rational only in a world where this 
content is truthful.  
This point can be further supported by examining the nature of the practical 
commitment involved in performing such an action. I have suggested (in Section 3B) that 
due to their functional role, motivating reasons determine the nature of the 'subsidiary 
actions' of which the overall course of action is composed, and thus the content of the 
practical commitment embedded in a given intentional action (when it is characterized in a 
fine-grained manner); the latter includes a commitment to adjust the execution of one's 
intention in a way that appropriately matches the content of one's motivating reason(s). 
Such practical commitment involves, it seems, a particularly strong epistemic commitment 
to the belief whose content figures in one's motivating reason, akin to endorsing it. This is 
evident in actions that are somewhat temporally extended (such as a job interview): in 
performing such an action, the agent consistently adjusts her subsidiary actions to match the 
content of her underlying discriminatory belief, thus repetitively affirming her commitment 
to the belief's truthfulness and her willingness to view its content as a consideration 
counting in favor of acting. 
Another way of supporting these claims is by showing that the features of beliefs 
tacitly endorsed in that manner resemble those of beliefs endorsed by conscious reflection. 
One important feature often associated with reflective endorsement is the agent's 
disposition to assert her reflectively endorsed beliefs. A similar feature is present when one 
incorporates the content of her belief in her motivating reason. As noted above, an agent is 
disposed to present the content of her motivating reason in response to the question, 'Why 
did you act the way you did?' A natural way of understanding an answer to such a question 
is not as a mere presentation of the belief's content; rather, it should be understood as 
asserting it. In saying, for example, 'I acted the way I did because Roma should not be 
associated with,' I do not only present the proposition that guided me in executing my 
intention in a neutral way; I am asserting that 'Roma should not be associated with!' in a way 
indicating endorsement.   
As can be seen, then, in acting with the motivational structure characteristic of 
intentional discrimination the agent exhibits a particularly objectionable discriminatory 
attitude, that is, she endorses her discriminatory belief, or has a high degree of epistemic 
commitment to its truthfulness. This attitude is markedly more objectionable relative to the 
discriminatory attitude underlying unintentional discriminatory actions, where at most a 
discriminatory belief only causally influences the agent's behavior, and, considering that 
implicit biases may consist in something other than beliefs (e.g. conceptual associations) the 
agent might not even believe a discriminatory proposition. Considering that the underlying 
discriminatory attitude is what generates the moral objection to discriminatory actions (in 
conjunction with the group-based differential treatment), it is plausible that this generates 
the particular severity of intentional discriminatory actions, making them significantly more 
objectionable relative to unintentional ones.  
Intentional and Unintentional Discrimination 





Despite the prominence of the distinction between intentional and unintentional 
discrimination in the literature and public discourse, basic conceptual and ethical questions 
surrounding it remain obscure. The paper has attempted to take the first step towards a 
clearer, more philosophically-informed discussion of the topic. It has argued that the ethical 
difference between the two types is traceable to a difference in the agent's underlying 
attitude: while in intentional discrimination discriminators endorse a discriminatory 
proposition (by seeing it as a consideration that counts in favor of their action), in 
unintentional discriminatory actions they are only causally influenced by a discriminatory 
mental state—making them act in a manner consistent with a discriminatory proposition 
without endorsing it. Recent developments in the literature and the political landscape have 
reinvigorated debates to which the distinction is relevant; the discussion here will, I hope, 
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